近日，厦门大学邹至庄经济研究中心与经济学院经济学系陈德麟助理教授，独立撰写的论文“Divide and conquer in two-sided markets: A potential-game approach”在国际一流期刊The RAND Journal of Economics 在线发表。
Network effects typically generate multiple equilibria in two-sided markets. To overcome the methodological challenge of selecting an appropriate equilibrium, this article shows that many two-sided market models are weighted potential games, and therefore a refinement of Nash equilibrium justified by many theoretical and experimental studies, potential maximization, pins down an equilibrium. Under potential maximization, platforms often subsidize one side and charge the other, i.e., divide and conquer. The primary determinant of which side to subsidize/monetize is cross-side network effects. This divide-and-conquer strategy implies that platforms are often designed to favor the money side much more than the subsidy side.
陈德麟，美国波士顿大学经济学博士，于2021年加盟厦大经济学科，现为厦门大学邹至庄经济研究中心、经济学院经济学助理教授。研究领域为微观经济学理论和产业组织。论文发表在The RAND Journal of Economics 等国际期刊上。
（经济学院 刘晨宇）
