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Monetary and Non-Monetary Incentives for Teams: Evidence from Two Field Experiments

主讲人: Iwan Barankay
主讲人简介: Iwan Barankay (University of Pennsylvania)
at low ability quantiles, i.e. for weak workers, the information effect is negative and the prize effect is nil so that tournaments reduce productivity, but at high ability quantiles, the information effect is nil and the prize effect is positive so that tournaments increase productivityWe also assess the effect of the tournament on workplace organization. Workers work in teams, the composition of which is at their discretion. In the control regime, workers are paid piece rates based on team productivity. We find that both information feedback and prizes lead to a change in team composition: after the introduction of the tournament teams are more likely to be formed among workers of similar ability and teams are less likely to be formed among workers belonging to the same social network.
时间: 2008年10月07日(周二)18:15-19:30
地点: 经济楼D110
类型: 独立讲座
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